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THE REMEDIAL AUTHORITY OF THE 
LABOUR ARBITRATOR: 
REVISED JUDICIAL VERSION 
PAUL WEILER* 
Vancouver 
A crucial problem is surfacing in contemporary labour arbitration 
in Canada. The crisis is occasioned by the almost exponential 
growth in judicial review of arbitration decisions in recent years. 
One finds a recurring theme in many of the cases in which the 
courts actually quash the decisions of arbitration boards. These 
cases required the exercise of remedial powers by the boards. 
Once an arbitrator sees a violation of one of the terms and obli-
gations of the collective agreement he must decide what, if any-
thing, to do about it. In recent years our judges, especially those 
from Ontario, have tended to have a very different view of this 
problem than the one which appears to prevail within the arbitra-
tion profession itself. Analysis of the opposing positions leads us 
directly to some of the fundamental and enduring dilemmas of 
the arbitration process. What is the nature and extent of an arbi-
trator's authority and what is the proper scope of judicial super-
vision of its exercise? 
I. Polymer. 
There are two alternative models of the labour arbitration which 
are relevant to this issue.' Let me sketch each in turn and trace 
out their implications. On the one view, a collective agreement 
is a contract. The parties have reached an agreement, each making
certain commitments to the other, and then expressed their over-
all bargain in writing. Disputes about the administration of this 
agreement are channelled into the arbitration process. The stand-
* Paul Weiler, of the Ontario Bar, Professor of Law, Osgoode Hall Law 
School (on leave), Chairman, Labour Relations Board of British Columbia.
1 Here I draw on two of my earlier writings which have developed the 
analyses in greater detail and for a much broader range of issues; Weiler,
The Role of the Labour Arbitrator: Alternative Versions (1969), 19 U.
of T. L.J. 16; Labour Arbitration and Industrial Change (1970). The
reader who is interested in the general literature relevant to this problem 
area will find references to the important pieces there. 
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ard arbitration clause in collective agreements enjoins arbitrators to 
interpret and apply the agreement and prohibits their supplement-
ing, deleting, or amending the agreed-to terms. Within this per-
spective the arbitrator's function is, quite simply, to be the official 
reader of the agreement to discover what obligations the parties 
have assumed under it. He must perform that function but that is 
all he may do. 
Not only is this a logically coherent position, but it also has 
an important practical value. The arbitrator is supposed to respect 
the integrity of the bargain which unions and management have 
arrived at. This presumption is an essential corollary of a system 
of free collective bargaining. Each negotiating party is empowered 
to act on the basis of its own perception of its essential interests 
and to pursue them to the extent that its bargaining power makes 
feasible. The resultant compromise which the two sides arrive at 
is not to be altered by an arbitrator acting on the basis of his own 
views of what is just and equitable. Accordingly arbitrators are 
not entitled to add to or subtract from the benefits secured by one 
or the other side in the agreement. We are all familiar with the 
distaste felt by both union and management negotiators for com-
pulsory interest-dispute arbitration of the terms of an agreement. 
This distrust is aggravated, and justifiably so, when an ad hoc 
grievance arbitrator covertly imposes new terms or limitations of 
substance, favouring one side or the other, by reference to such 
vague phrases as "the climate of collective bargaining".' 
With this model of labour arbitration in mind, we can under-
stand the union argument in Polymer Corp.,3 still the most crucial 
event in the development of arbitral powers in Canadian labour 
law. In that case, the union had been found in violation of its 
obligation not to conduct or permit a strike during the term of 
the collective agreement. The company in its grievance also sought 
damages for lost revenues during the duration of the strike but the 
union challenged the arbitrator's authority to grant them. The 
agreement contained an explicit prohibition of strikes but was 
completely silent on the power of an arbitrator to award damages 
for violation of this term or, indeed, of any other provision of the 
agreement. Union counsel's argument was quite simple and straight-
forward. The sole source of an arbitrator's authority is the volun-
tary acceptance of contractual commitments by both sides, as ex-
I This is the famous phrase of the then Professor Laskin as the arbitra-
tor in Peterboro Lock Mfg. (1953), 4 L.A.C. 1499, at p. 1502. I have 
critically assessed this position in Ch. 1 of the book, cited in footnote 1 
above. 
3(1959), 10 L.A.C. 51 (Laskin). This decision and its background was 
thoroughly canvassed in Palmer, The Remedial Authority of Labour Arbi-
trators, [1940] Current Law & Social Problems 125. 
31 1974] Remedial Authority of Labour Arbitrator 
pressed in their agreement. Absent such a mutual intention, there 
is no power in an arbitrator to add a remedial term to the agree-
ment and then act upon it. 
In one of the most powerful opinions in the history of Canadian 
labour arbitration, Professor Bora Laskin, as he then was, took 
up the challenge and sketched an alternative model of the arbitra-
tor's function and authority. The key to his approach is his re-
jection of the absolute, all-embracing reign of the contractual 
foundation of labour arbitration. It simply is not true that the 
parties opted for arbitration of grievances as a matter of voluntary 
choice. Instead, the relevant labour legislation, reflecting a com-
prehensive collective bargaining policy, directed the parties to use 
grievance arbitration as a means of securing final and binding 
settlement of their disputes in the administration of the agreement. 
This legislative policy was in sharp contrast to the attitude of 
common law judges' who had rejected the enforceability of the 
collective agreement in the ordinary courts and told the parties 
to use their weapon of self-belp--be it strike or lockout-to secure 
their rights under the original bargain. The new collective bargain-
ing policy of the statute seeks to prohibit such economic warfare 
during the term of an agreement. To this end it directed the parties 
to provide for a peaceful method of securing an authoritative 
settlement which, in effect, meant grievance arbitration.' 
Within this framework, the key question is not what the parties 
intended in adopting an arbitration clause in their agreement. 
This conception, 
. . . ignores the fundamental fact that the mutual acceptance of arbitra-
tion by the parties is not a matter of undertaking of obligations toward 
each other but a remission of their disputes to final and binding ad-
judication by an external tribunal. The central question is hence not 
one of construing the limits of rights and obligations inter se but rather 
of determining what is involved in arbitration. This determination must 
take account of the role that arbitration is designed to play in collective 
agreement administration.6 
Accordingly, to determine the scope of an arbitrator's authority, 
' Young v. C.N.R., [1931] A.C. 83 (P.C.).
In Ontario, s. 37(1) of the Labour Relations Act, R.S.O., 1970, c. 232, 
as am., reads: "Every collective agreement shall provide for the final and 
binding settlement by arbitration without stoppage of work, of all differ-
ences between the parties arising from the interpretation, application, ad-
ministration or alleged violation of the agreement including any question 
as to whether a matter is arbitrable." 
Under the federal statute in question in Polymer, as well as certain 
provincial labour relations statutes, the corresponding portions provide for 
settlement "by arbitration or otherwise". As a practical matter, this legal
distinction is unimportant. The parties are required to adopt some method: 
the only viable option is grievance arbitration, they adopt this, and use the 
same procedures and personnel for this purpose.
6 Supra, footnote 3, at p. 58. 
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we must have recourse to the legislative policy in favour of peace-
ful adjudication of contract grievances. What is "the full range 
of the tribunal's adjudicative powers which are immanent in such 
adjudication"?7 Professor Laskin's response was forthright:8 
That the adjudication was intended to be remedial as well as declaratory 
could hardly be doubted. Expeditious settlement of grievances without 
undue formality and without excessive cost was no less a key to success-
ful collective bargaining in day to day administration than the success-
ful negotiations in the first place. Favourable settlement where an em-
ployee was aggrieved meant not a formal abstract declaration of his 
rights but affirmative relief to give him his due according to the rights 
and obligations of the collective agreement . . . To have proposed to 
union negotiators that collective agreements, so long ignored in law 
and left to "lawless" enforcement by strikes and picketing, should con-
tinue to be merely empty vehicles for propounding declarations of 
right when the right to strike was taken away, would be to mock the 
policy of compulsory collective bargaining legislation... 
What was true in the case of aggrieved employees or aggrieved unions 
could be no less true in the case of aggrieved employers. 
To the same effect, he stated:9 
The pivotal issue is simply whether the exercise of arbitral authority 
encompasses the effectuation of the right and the enforcement of the 
obligations which are submitted for both original and final adjudication. 
One would ordinarily think . . . that if there is any area of adjudica-
tion where abstract pronouncements, devoid of direction for redress of 
violations, would be unwelcome it would be in labour arbitration. 
Put this way, the proper response seemed clear to Professor 
Laskin-and to me as well. But it is important to spell out in 
explicit detail the reasons why this is so, and the factors which 
differentiate the arbitral assertion of remedial powers from the 
kinds of creativity which I termed illegitimate earlier. When union 
and management sit down to negotiate an agreement, they are 
almost totally concerned with what I would call the substantive 
benefits obtained and costs assumed by each. What types of fringe 
payments will employees receive? What forms of eligibility re-
quirements must they satisfy? What restrictions do employers and 
employees place on their freedom of action? In these negotiations, 
the tacit assumption is that, normally, the obligations will be ad-
hered to and the rights secured and what is at issue is how much 
are they worth and what will they cost. Arbitral intervention to 
revise this bargain in selected areas is, I believe, improper, and 
to be excluded by the standard limitations on arbitral power. 
Sometimes, of course, this expectation that the terms will be 
adhered to in the primary activities of the private parties is not 
7Ibid., at p. 60. 
Ibid., at p. 56. 
'Ibid. 
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fulfilled. Breaches will occur, either because of bona fide disa-
greements about what the agreement requires or a simple refusal 
to perform the obligations a party has assumed. The statutes re-
quire a peaceful method of settling these disputes and the parties 
insert a grievance procedure culminating in binding arbitration. 
Neither the statutes nor the collective agreement contains more 
than a bare-bones description of what is entailed by grievance 
arbitration. The accidents of a particular bargaining relationship 
may produce special rules directed at a couple of issues in the pro-
cess. In my experience it is never the case that a comprehensive 
outline is included, sufficient to allow arbitration to be carried on 
in simple reliance -on the expressed intentions of the parties. 
Union and management assume that there is such a process, that 
it has a well-defined shape, and that the arbitrators who are select-
ed will have enough sense to understand and conform to what is 
"immanent in such adjudication", to the "import conveyed by such 
an agreed resort to final and binding arbitration". But only arbi-
trators can make precise the nature of these standards and powers. 
I may be just belabouring the obvious, but let me mention 
some of the recurring questions in the arbitration process about 
which the vast majority of collective agreements are invariably 
silent. Let us start with the arbitration procedure. Who is to go 
first in leading evidence, what is the proper allocation of the bur-
den of proof, what is the correct sequence for examining witnesses, 
when do third parties have a right to intervene, and so on? These 
are not straw men; such questions have triggered controversy and 
arbitral opinions in over twenty years in the reports. Next, let us 
consider the decision-making process. What canons of contract 
interpretation are to be used, what is the proper role of extrinsic 
evidence, judicial or arbitral precedent, res judicata and so on? 
These also are matters which are important, often debated, re-
flected in arbitration decisions, but never dealt with in any detail 
in collective agreements. The parties have much more pressing 
matters to resolve in their often tense negotiations. Yet we must 
realize that the arbitration process will be a "non-starter" without 
answers to each of these questions. 
If they stuck rigidly to the first model of labour arbitration, 
arbitrators would have to say that we just read the agreement, 
when we do we find nothing there about who is to go first, we 
cannot add such a term, in the absence of immediate agreement 
the arbitration hearing cannot start, and so everyone just has to go 
home. That may reflect a literal reading of the agreement, but it 
mocks the provision which an arbitrator can read in the statute, 
that there is supposed to be final and binding settlement of these 
issues in arbitration. As a result, arbitrators have had to develop 
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from the very beginning a common law jurisprudence of the system 
of arbitration itself. As a consensus has emerged in the course 
of reported decisions, this becomes the framework within which 
experienced negotiators write the arbitration clause into their 
collective bargaining agreements. 
The same response is appropriate for the third problem-area, 
the one which arises when the arbitrator has discovered a breach 
of the agreement. What is he to do about it? Perhaps it is not ab-
surd on the face of it to respond that he should do nothing. The 
arbitration has gotten under way, the evidence' has been heard, 
findings of fact have been made, and the relevant portions of the 
agreement have been interpreted. But surely Professor Laskin 
was correct in saying that if arbitrators took the self-limiting stance 
of merely producing abstract declarations of right, this would de-
prive the process of its significance as a crucial element in labour 
relations policy, the vehicle for peaceful settlement of disputes 
under a collective agreement. If one party has refused to give the 
other the benefit of his bargain under the agreement, will he al-
ways, or even usually, meekly offer to make redress after the 
arbitrator has told him what the agreement means? If he does not, 
is the aggrieved party to acquiesce in that situation, or will he not 
likely take measures of self-help, and start down the path of esca-
lating labour unrest? 
I suggest, then, that in the remedial area, as well as in matters 
of procedure or arbitral reasoning, both the statute and the col-
lective agreement require creative arbitral elaboration of what is 
involved in final and binding arbitration. The simple reason is 
that there is no alternative source of such standards which are 
necessary for the fulfilment of the arbitrator's mandate. The 
"reader" conception of labour arbitration is just not an adequate 
response to these problems. 
There are two further factors justifying the development of a 
body of arbitral jurisprudence in the remedial area, both of which 
were mentioned by Professor Laskin. One is that there was a ready 
source of analogies on which arbitrators could rely in fashioning 
their standards. The common law courts for a long time had 
adjudicated disputes arising out of commercial contracts and had 
developed an extensive body of legal doctrines. Not all of these 
were readily transferable to the context of arbitration of a col-
lective agreement but most of them were, at least with suitable 
refinements. The award of damages for harm caused by violations 
of a contract was a classic example. The point is that neither the 
parties nor arbitrators were left in the air as to what rules to 
adopt. There was an established source of legal materials to shape 
and channel the creative task. 
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Second, and I believe even more important, is the recipro-
city of adjudicative remedies. The power to award damages would 
be available to aggrieved claimants from either side. Here the 
grievor was the company but in another case Professor Laskin had 
awarded damages to an employee.'" Hence we need not be con-
cerned about the fatal defect in arbitral policy-making with re-
spect to the substantive terms of the agreement. In the latter situa-
tion, if an arbitrator implies a new provision to work what he sees 
as justice for one side, he necessarily tilts the balance in the bar-
gain against the other. To use the jargon of game theory, we have 
a zero-sum game; what one side wins the other, perforce, must 
lose. I do not believe this is a serious problem at the remedial 
level. There arbitrators have a much more neutral and impersonal 
task, working out the implications of a system of fair and effective 
adjudication, which will be available to either side when the sub-
stantive or primary rules generate disputes. 
These are the factors which justified the Polymer award in 
favour of an implied power to award damages. The union took 
the award to court and was unsuccessful at all three levels." Not 
one of these opinions really does justice to the problem, and clear-
ly perceives the issue of whether the arbitrator's jurisdiction "to 
award damages must be found in the language by the parties as an 
expression of their intention' ' 12 or whether it is a supplementary 
power inferred from the legislative policy in favour of final and 
binding settlement of disputes through arbitration. Both lower 
courts assume that the proper question is the former, but then find 
the answer in the latter source:'" 
We are confirmed in our view and in that interpretation of the agree-
ment by a consideration of the compulsory atmosphere, if I may put
it that way, in which pursuant to statute .... the parties are required 
to bargain in good faith and in concluding a collective agreement to 
include therein a provision for the final settlement without stoppage
of work of all differences between the parties concerning the meaning
of the agreement or violations thereof. 
Of course, since there was not one iota of evidence in the written 
agreement that the parties intended such a jurisdiction for the arbi-
trator, the only source of an affirmative answer had to be the 
statute. It is unfortunate that the judges did not explicitly accept 
the legitimacy of the legal platform on which in fact they relied. 
It is also unfortunate, though perhaps not unexpected, that the 
'0 In Amalgamated Electric (1950), 2 L.A.C. 597 (Laskin). 
11The case was reported as Imbleau v. Laskin et al. (1961), 26 D.L.R. 
(2d) 609 (Ont. H.C.); (1961), 28 D.L.R. (2d) 81 (Ont. C.A.); [1962] 
S.C.R. 338. 
"Mr. Justice McRuer, in the High Court, at p. 614.8 Mr. Justice Aylesworth for the Ontario Court of Appeal, at p. 82,
emphasis mine. 
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Supreme Court of Canada simply agreed with the lower courts 
without further reasoning. 
II. Port Arthur Shipbuilding. 
What are the implications of the Polymer decision? Read most 
narrowly, it stands for the proposition that arbitrators can award 
damages for union breaches of the no-strike clause. Of course, it 
is impossible to avoid the corollary that arbitrators have the power 
to award damages against any party for losses occasioned by his 
breach of any term of the agreement." The thesis of this article, 
though, is that the case has a much wider significance. The princi-
ple or rationale which logically underlies either of these statements 
of the immediate holding is that a labour arbitrator is more than 
just a reader of the language of the agreement. He must be con-
sidered an adjudicator,with all of the unforeseeable implications 
that status may hold. What are the ramifications of Polymer for 
the many other related situations, and how have subsequent arbi-
trators and judges deferred to its rationale? 
Suppose, for example, the company takes a view of the collec-
tive agreement which puts it in breach of its obligations. The union 
lodges a grievance, takes the company to arbitration and secures 
a favourable interpretation and damage award. The company pays 
that award but adamantly refuses to alter its course and continues 
in default notwithstanding the arbitration award. So the union 
goes back to arbitration and obtains the same ruling and another 
award for accumulated damages. Can the union also secure a 
mandatory "order prospectively requiring payment of future ar-
rears"? The virtue of this award would be that the union would 
be able to obtain its immediate enforcement in courts in cases of 
future breaches without the added delay and expense of further 
arbitration on the merits (which is aggravated by the inability of 
arbitrators to award costs against losing parties). In a carefully 
reasoned opinion, the arbitrator in Polax Tailoring"1 held that this 
form of quia timet order of specific performance was within the 
'4 In Toronto Star Ltd. (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 14,092 (Ont. H.C.), Mr. 
Justice Osler took this one step further by holding that there was an im-
plied power to. award damages for breach even of an implied obligation 
under the agreement. His opinion nicely focused on the rationale of Poly-
mer to the effect that the arbitral remedial power "is not a matter of the 
undertaking of obligations towards each other but a remission of their 
disputes to final and binding adjudication by an external tribunal". It is 
unfortunate that he has not considered fully the implications of that ration-
ale in his further involvement in this area; see at footnotes 36 and 50 infra. 
15 (1972), 24 L.A.C. 201 (Arthurs). This decision was recently upheld 
by the Ontario Divisional Court sub nom. Samuel Cooper v. International 
Ladies Garment Workers Union (1973), 35 D.L.R. (3d) 301. 
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implied powers envisaged by the Polymer decision.'" 
Professor Arthurs constructed his argument out of a series of 
judicial decisions, some in labour relations but others involving 
ordinary contracts, in which this kind of power was exercised. On 
the basis of these analogies he felt entitled to make his unusual 
order, notwithstanding the absence of an explicit jurisdiction to 
do so under the collective agreement. Strangely, though, arbitrators 
have consistently assumed that they have an impl'ed power to 
make another kind of order, one which is unknown to the common 
law. 7 If an employee is discharged without just cause, and in 
breach of the agreement, the arbitrator does not simply award 
damages for lost earnings. He also orders the reinstatement of the 
employee, notwithstanding that this involves the specific enforce-
ment of a contract of personal service. The legitimacy of this 
arbitral remedy (which is also available for violation of seniority 
clauses and so on) is not questioned in judicial review, notwith-
standing that courts will not order reinstatement themselves if 
the employee lodges his claim in court." 
The third asserted, arbitral power commonly exercised in dis-
charge cases, one which did run afoul of the courts, was exercised in 
the case of Port Arthur Shipbuilding." Here the arbitration board 
was faced with three long-service employees who had been dis-
charged for absenting themselves from work for several days to 
take temporary employment elsewhere. For my purposes, I need 
not go into the details of the situation. Suffice it to say that the 
majority of the arbitration board, after considering the circum-
stances of the offence and the background of the offenders, held 
that the employees' conduct was not "proper cause" for the serious 
16In a recent arbitration decision, Canadian Johns-Manville (1971), 22 
L.A.C. 396 (Weiler), I drew somewhat the same inference about the arbi-
trator's remedial powers. The employee-grievor had been wrongfully denied 
his turn to work Saturday overtime at premium rates and asked for dam-
ages for the lost wages. If this were the only possible remedy, he would be 
entitled to it. However, as the company pointed out, this would result in 
a windfall to the employee. He would receive the pay now after having
had the Saturday free; meanwhile the company would have to pay two 
employees to obtain one day's work. I agreed with the company that there 
was an alternative, the award of an extra overtime turn on the company 
roster (in place of the employee who had already worked). If an arbitrator 
has power to award money damages for a lost work opportunity, then, a 
fortiori, he should have the power to make a compensatory award in kind 
(assuming this is feasible). Neither power is explicitly conferred by over-
time clauses, or any other contractual provisions; they are implications of 
the arbitrator's implicit authority to fashion appropriate remedies for 
breaches of the agreement. 
"See Clawson, Comment (1948), 26 Can. Bar Rev. 998. 
1" Compare, e.g., Zeller's (Western) Ltd. v. Retail Wholesale & Dept. 
Store Union (1972), 31 D.L.R. (3d) 742 (Sask. C.A.) with Woods v. 
Mirarnichi Hospital (1968), 68 C.L.L.C. 14.104 (N.B.C.A.). 
1" (1966), 17 L.A.C. 109 (Arthurs); (1967) 60 D.L.R. (2d) 214 (Ont. 
H.C.); (1967), 62 D.L.R. (2d) 342 (Ont. C.A.); [1969] S.C.R. 85. 
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offence of discharge and ordered the employees reinstated. Be-
cause the board felt that the employees were guilty of misconduct 
worthy of some discipline it substituted suspension of between ten 
and fifteen weeks for the several employees. 
There are two distinct legal propositions implicit in this con-
clusion, both of which were tested in judicial review of the deci-
sion. In interpreting the scope of "proper cause for discharge", 
was an arbitrator entitled to hold that employee misconduct war-
ranting some discipline was not serious enough to justify the ulti-
mate penalty of discharge (whether because of the nature of the 
offence, extenuating circumstances in its occurrence, or mitigating 
circumstances in the records of an employee)? Personally I find 
it hard to fathom how any argument can be advanced against such 
a conclusion." Assuming an affirmative answer to this first ques-
tion, a second, remedial issue arises. Is an arbitrator entitled to 
substitute what he believes to be the proper, lesser discipline or 
is he required to reinstate the employee outright with full com-
pensation for his lost wages? 
In the final analysis, the board's decision was quashed. Per-
haps the most charitable interpretation of the opinions reaching 
that result, including that of the Supreme Court of Canada, is that 
they disagreed with the arbitrator on the facts of the immediate 
case (though how this amounted to an error of law is still dub-
ious). Certainly these opinions appear totally to confuse these 
two logically distinct questions. The assumption seemed to be that 
because the arbitrator could not exercise the management's power 
to impose a suspension, he could not find the discharge improper 
and order reinstatement. The second conclusion simply does not 
follow from the first. 
The only two opinions which appreciated the distinction be-
tween these two issues were those of Justices Laskin and Wells of 
the Ontario Court of Appeal which upheld the arbitration board. 
Moreover, as both judges realized, the real beneficiary of this 
implied remedial power would be the employer, not the employee 
or union. Only Mr. Justice Wells felt compelled to address the 
question of whether the arbitrator had that power. He started from 
the rationale of Polymer: ' 
201 shall refrain from discussing this issue of the scope of an arbitrator's 
power to review the substance of management's discharge decisions. My 
views are set out in detail in my arbitration decision, S.K.D. Mfg. (1969), 
20 L.A.C. 231 (Weiler) and in my book Supreme Court of Canada (1973), 
Ch. 5. Suffice it to say that in Ontario the decision was neutralized by 
legislation. In other provinces, the lower courts are limiting its impact: see 
King Size Photo Service (1970), 70 C.L.L.C. 14,042 (Sask. Q.B.); Coulson 
Prescott Logging, [1972] 4 W.W.R. 51 (B.C.C.A.).
21 Supra, footnote 19, at p. 354. 
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A right to decide what was referred and if unfavourable to the action 
taken, what consequential relief should follow to the parties, seems to 
me to be necessary to produce a final and binding settlement. 
After agreeing that the arbitrator had the power to look at all of 
the circumstances of the employees' offence, "and particularly 
long years of service, apparently without black marks against 
them", to find that discharge was not justified, he continued:2 
To have simply restored these men to their employment, however, would 
have been a gross injustice to the employer. So, within the terms of the 
collective agreement, the majority of the arbitrators tried to determine 
what the proper remedy and discipline was. In doing so they were at-
tempting to bring the matter to a final conclusion and to deal with it 
once and for all. That unquestionably is one of the purposes for. which 
they were appointed and for which they were acting. 
What was the possible result of the alternative conclusion of no 
arbitral power to substitute an appropriate penalty:2" 
Then, proceeding under whatever action the employer chose, it could 
have continued the dispute indefinitely, there would be one decision 
in respect of the facts submitted which was final and binding. Such a 
condition in my opinion is clearly not within the contemplation of the 
collective agreement and in my opinion the majority of the board had 
the implied power to do what they did. 
Mr. Justice Schroeder, dissenting in the Ontario Court of Ap-
peal, and Mr. Justice Judson, for the unanimous Supreme Court 
of Canada, disagreed. Their holding that the arbitrator had no 
such implied remedial power was relatively clear; it was the logic 
of their further conclusion, reversing the arbitrator's judgment 
that discharge was improper, which remains obscure, at least to 
me. Schroeder J.'s general stance about implication of terms was 
expressed in these words:4 
These observations, differently expressed, admonish Judges that they 
have no right to make contracts for the parties; that their province is 
to interpret contracts and not on any arbitrary principle or by pre-
sumption to nullify the clear intention of the parties as expressed in 
words deliberately chosen by them to govern their employer-employee 
relationship and set out in a formal contract which is more frequently 
than not the consummation of protracted and arduous bargaining on 
both sides. 
His conclusion about the arbitrator's asserted remedial power 
was: 
The choice of penalty is thereby committed to management and to it 
alone. Had the parties intended that a board hearing a grievance sub-
mission should be entitled to substitute suspension for dismissal, that 
' Ibid., at p. 359. 
23 Ibid. 
2 4 
2 2Ibid., at p. 347.Ibid. 
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intent should have been clearly expressed in appropriate language. In 
the absence of such a provision there was no authority in the board to 
pursue that course. 
This analysis, which was adopted by Judson J. without any 
further contribution of note, is not an adequate response to the 
issue. The clear implication of Polymer is that the scope of reme-
dial authority in arbitration is not to be assessed by reference only 
to the written intention of the parties; equally important is the 
statutory context of a labour relations policy in favour of final and 
binding settlement of disputes through arbitration. I do not mean 
to suggest that the implications of this policy were crystal-clear 
and that this arbitral power should necessarily have been upheld. 
There are differences between awarding damages and substituting 
new penalties. Besides the fact that the courts are more accustomed 
to the former, there is the further fact that management is given 
the power to make the original penalty decision. Perhaps this 
means that arbitrators should not encroach on this preroga-
tive when management has been found to have over-reacted. When 
one begins to look at the matter realistically under this approach, 
the arguments of Mr. Justice Wells would have to be dealt with 
(and I do not think they could be countered). Not only did Mr. 
Justice Judson fail to respond to the Mr. Justice Well's opinion, 
he did not even mention Polymer, the crucial precedent in the 
whole area. 
The Supreme Court in its opinion concluded with a passage 
which has had substantial impact:2" 
An arbitration board of this type under consideration has no inherent 
powers of review similar to those of the Courts. Its only powers are 
those conferred upon it by the collective agreement and' those are 
usually defined in some detail. It has no inherent power to amend, 
modify or ignore the collective agreement. But this is exactly what the 
board did in this case and .it was clearly in error in so doing and its 
award should be quashed. 
The absolutist tone of this language is diametrically opposed to the 
rationale' of Polymer, a decision of many of the same judges only 
seven years before. The arbitrator is restricted to reading the lan-
guage of the agreement; he has no further authority derived from 
his statutory mandate of adjudication. Yet, if this is so, why can 
he order reinstatement and award damages in cases of unjustified 
discharge, where these powers also are not conferred by the col-
lective agreement? The Supreme Court of Canada did not sug-
gest an answer for us. Yet the language of the court might have 
been-indeed, should have been--of no consequence to Canadian 
law. The Ontario legislature (under whose jurisdiction the Port 
" Ibid., at pp. 95-96. 
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Arthur Shipbuilding case had arisen) stepped in shortly after-
wards to repair the damage. It explicitly conferred on arbitrators 
the power to grant whatever remedies they believe "just and equit-
able"," when they find discipline to be unjustified. True this legis-
lation dealt only with the immediate problem of substituting new 
penalties. But the real point is that the legislature had authoritative-
ly disagreed with the view taken by the Supreme Court about the 
proper scope of arbitral authority. If a higher court had reversed 
that judicial decision, later courts would feel obliged to look to 
the underlying reasons advanced for the conclusion, and follow 
their implications in analogous cases." Surely a legislature, with its 
supposed legal predominance, should have the same deference paid 
to the policies or principles which underlie its statutory prescrip-
tions. Unfortunately, it is exactly the opposite approach which is 
conventional within our legal order. If a legislature disagrees with a 
judicial holding and feels constrained to alter the law by statute, 
this is merely added evidence that the underlying judicial rationale 
was the true common law approach all along: 9 
Judicial reversals avowedly based upon the social inexpediency of the 
earlier conclusion stifle its germinating powers but the same sober judg-
ment of a representative assembly merely adds virulence to the poison 
of judicial unwisdom. Indeed, at times, the process portrays a fantasy 
more than fit for a new Erewhon. 
III. The Current Legal Morass. 
(a) Rectification. 
Port Arthur Shipbuilding has indeed had a virulent effect on 
the further elaboration of the remedial law of labour arbitration. 
As a first example, let us consider this fact-situation. An article 
in a collective agreement provides for statutory holiday pay and 
sets up explicit qualifications for employee entitlement to this 
fringe benefit. In the previous agreement, one such qualification 
read: 
Article 13.07: To be eligible for pay for a statutory holiday . . . 
(D) any employee absent due to illness or accident must 
have been at work some time within the three month 
period previous to the holiday period. 
27Section 37(8) of the Ontario Labour Relations Act, supra, footnote 
5. The scope of that discretion was respected by the Ontario Divisional 
Court even in the fairly extreme case of Gould Manufacturing of Canada 
(1973), 73 C.L.L.C. 14,161. 
28 In fact, that is what Canadian judges have felt constrained to do by 
the Supreme Court's own decision in Port Arthur Shipbuilding reversing 
the Ontario Court of Appeal. 
29 Landis, Statutes and the Sources of Law (1965), 2 Harvard J. of 
Legis. 7, at pp. 23-24. 
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In negotiations, the parties agreed to revise the wording of the 
italicized phrase and the signed memorandum of agreement noted 
this change (under the heading "Delete and substitute") to per-
sonal sickness or accident. When the agreement was typed up and 
signed by the parties, this was the way the section emerged: 
Article 13.07: To be eligible for pay for a statutory holiday . . . 
(D) personal sickness or accident. 
On its face, as the union suggested, this seems to create an un-
conditional entitlement to holiday pay for any employee suffering 
from sickness or accident, no matter how long he was absent. But 
from this history, as well as from surrounding circumstances, it 
was easy for the board to conclude that the parties had intended 
no such result at all. As a result of errors in the transcription pro-
cess, the new italicized phrase had not been substituted for the cor-
responding language within the older clause; instead it had been 
typed in as the sum total of the wording of that clause, so as to 
suggest an entirely different legal result. The question was whether 
an arbitrator could do anything about the error in transcription 
when it was discovered some months later. 
There was a well-established doctrine of contract law which per-
mitted courts to rectify these mistakes in transcribing firm mutual 
agreements and this doctrine had been applied in several arbitra-
tion decisions. As the then Professor Laskin said:" "The Board 
sees no reason why an equity of reformation or rectification does 
not arise, as is usual in similar situations in the case of individual 
contracts of a commercial nature." In the instant case, Philips 
Electronic Industries," the board felt entitled to apply the same 
equitable doctrine, relying on both judicial and arbitral precedents. 
To the union argument that the board was overstepping its limited 
jurisdiction, this was the reply: 2 
It is well for this board to reiterate that what it has done has not been 
to alter, modify or amend the collective agreement between the parties 
but simply to rectify an obvious omission so that the agreement reads 
as it was negotiated and agreed upon by the parties. 
Unfortunately, in a recent judicial decision, Metropolitan 
Police Association," the use of this doctrine in arbitration was 
'0 In W. Harris & Co. (1953) unreported. 
'1 (1964), 15 L.A.C. 455 (Reville). 
Ibid., at p. 462. 
3 (1972), 72 C.L.L.C. 14,125 (Ont. C.A.). I should disclose immediate-
ly that I was the author of the arbitration award which was quashed in 
that case. The real issue in the case, both at arbitration and upon judicial 
review, was the correct interpretation of the collective agreement, and I do 
not intend to comment on the merits of that problem here. The issue of 
rectification was a subsidiary factor in my award. I followed without dis-
cussion a long-established practice of arbitrators using that doctrine, and 
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abruptly aborted. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that "con-
sensual arbitrators" had no power to rectify a written document 
in the face of the express limitations in the standard arbitration 
clause. Quoting Port Arthur Shipbuilding, the court said: ' 
If the collective agreement did not represent the true bargain between 
the parties, the party asserting this to be so could bring an action for 
rectification but . . . the arbitrator "had no inherent power to amend, 
modify, or ignore the collective agreement". 
No further analysis was considered necessary to support the judg-
ment that the arbitrator owes this absolute fealty to the typed 
copy of the collective agreement, rather than the original bargain 
as negotiated and incorporated in the signed memorandum of 
agreement. 
(b) Estoppel. 
A similar judicial attitude has surfaced regarding the use by 
arbitrators of another equitable doctrine, that of estoppel. Suppose 
a union business agent represents to a contractor that the double-
time requirement in an overtime clause in a master agreement 
does not apply to him on certain jobs. As a result the contractor 
signs the agreement, goes ahead and bids on the jobs without 
making provision for double-time, and then schedules some over-
time work. Now the employees lodge grievances claiming the extra 
premium pay and, on the face of it, appear to have a persuasive 
case under the wording of the overtime clause. Can the company 
rely on the doctrine of equitable estoppel to defeat this claim? 
Numerous arbitrators have said they can and a British Columbia 
High Court judge agreed on these facts in Ben Ginter Construc-
tion." He felt that "application of the doctrine does not involve 
modification of the agreement", and quotes Lord Denning to the 
effect that instead it bars the one party from asserting his legal 
rights in a way which is inconsistent with representations made to 
the other party, and relied on by the latter to his detriment. The 
implication of that legal policy seems quite clear in the above 
situation. 
Unfortunately the passage from Port Arthur Shipbuilding 
reared its ugly head again in a recent decision of the Ontario Divi-
sional Court, Sarnia General Hospital.' Here the arbitrator had 
the court's holding as to that issue was really a reversal of the arbitral 
practice. Accordingly, I do feel free to include this crucial appellate court 
decision in my review of the legal area. I should add as well that I was also 
the arbitrator in the Union Carbide and Hoar Transport cases, referred to 
in footnotes 56 and 58 respectively, and again I shall just mention the 
judicial holdings in these two cases without dwelling on their merits. 
Ibid., at p. 519. 
- (1967), 67 C.L.L.C. 14,032 (B.C.S.C.). 
a (1973), 73 C.L.L.C. 14,157 (Ont. Div. Ct). 
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found the language of an agreement unambiguous and refused to 
look at extrinsic evidence to modify his conclusions. In response 
to the employer's attempt to have the court require the arbitrator 
to consider this evidence, on the grounds inter alia, of equitable 
estoppel, here is what the court said:" 
As to estoppel by conduct, it is rarely if ever that such principles can 
arise in proceedings such as these being reviewed. A Board such as this 
one . . . has no "inherent power to amend, modify, or ignore the col-
lective agreement". The Board is there to interpret the collective agree-
ment, not to ignore it or go around it. 
Believing, correctly, that this issue was closely analogous to the 
doctrine of rectification dealt with by Metropolitan Police Assoc-
iation, the court instructed arbitrators not to use either device to 
prevent a party "from maintaining that the agreement meant what 
its plain words said it meant". 
(c) Illegality." 
Suppose the parties have negotiated a clause which turns out 
to be illegal under governing legislation. Can the arbitrator deem 
the provision void and unenforceable, and prevent a party relying 
on "what its plain words said it meant"? Can the arbitrator go 
further and affirmatively enforce an alternative obligation imposed 
by the statute on the parties' relationship? Two Ontario High Court 
judges have responded negatively to these two questions. In Inter-
nationalChemical Workers Union v. Krever,9 an arbitration board 
accepted a company's defence to a grievance that adherence to 
the collective agreement would put it in breach of a federal safety 
statute. This decision was reversed by a judge who said, inter 
alia:' 
In my view the Board is strictly limited to interpreting the written con-
tract and this it has not seen fit to do. . . . The matter should be re-
mitted to the Board for determination of the narrow issue between the 
parties strictly in accordance with the terms of the Agreement. 
In the next case, R.C.A. Victor Ltd., 1 it was the union which 
sought to broaden the arbitrator's jurisdiction to encompass the 
statute while the company wanted him confined to the contract. 
The collective agreement provided for limited major medical in-
surance at the expense of the company. When the province enacted 
"Ibid., at p. 14,721. 
" Here I just summarize a more detailed discussion in an earlier com-
ment of mine, The Arbitrator, the Collective Agreement and the Law. 
(1972), 10 Osgoode Hall L.J. 141. The Etobicoke case, infra, footnote 44, 
occurred subsequent to this comment and is canvassed more thoroughly
here. 
39 (1968), 68 C.L.L.C. 14,086 (Ont. H.C.). 
"Ibid., at p. 380. 
41 (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 14,099 (Ont. H.C.). 
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a comprehensive, compulsory medical insurance plan, O.H.S.I.P., 
this provision was rendered null and void. Another section of the 
statute provided for continuance of the employer's obligations to 
pay premiums for medical insurance and transference of this ob-
ligation to premiums for the public scheme. The union lodged a 
grievance claiming that the company should pay the premiums 
for O.H.S.I.P."2 The court held that an arbitrator had no power 
to uphold such a grievance based on a statute, rather than the 
agreement. After quoting from Port Arthur Shipbuilding he said: 
A board of arbitration derives its authority from and is limited by 
the terms of the collective agreement. Its jurisdiction is solely to deter-
mine questions arising with respect to the application, administration, 
or alleged violation of the collective agreement. The Board was limited in 
its consideration of the grievance to the question as to whether or not 
the collective agreement, as opposed to the statute, imposed an obliga-
tion on the part of the company to pay all the additional O.H.S.I.P. pre-
miums. . . . The majority award is therefore beyond the jurisdiction of 
the board by reason of the fact it has based its decision on an inter-
pretation of the statute rather than on the collective agreement. 
In a more recent decision of the Ontario courts in this area, 
Boardof Education of Etobicoke v. C.U.P.E.,' the law was taken, 
unaccountably, in a somewhat different direction. A collective 
agreement established a sick pay credit scheme which provided, 
inter alia, that on retirement for age or ill health an employee 
would receive a cash payment for his unused credit up to a maxi-
mum of six months pay. After administering this scheme for 
several years, the employer discovered a provision in the School 
Administration Act which apparently made this payment illegal. 
Section 44(1) of that Act allowed a Board, by resolution, "to 
establish a system of sick leave credit gratuities for employees... 
provided that on termination of employment an employee is en-
titled to sick credit for no more than an amount equal to his 
salary . . . for one-half of the days standing to his credit, and in 
any event not in excess of the amount of one-half year's earnings". 
When the school board discontinued the payments required by 
the agreement, grievances were lodged and went to arbitration. 
The majority of the board of arbitration posed the key ques-
tion raised by the case: "Do statutory provisions which apparently 
prohibit conduct which is otherwise permissible under the collective 
agreement override the terms of the collective agreement?"' After 
referring to both Krever and R.C.A. Victor, quoting the language 
from the latter excerpted above, the majority concluded that once 
42Which, I might add, offered broader coverage but at a higher cost; 
this factor was revelant only to a second issue in the case. 
" Supra, footnote 41, at pp. 424-25. 
44(1973), 73 C.L.L.C. 14,164 (Ont. Div. Ct). 
45 (1972), 24 L.A.C. 255, at p. 259. 
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an arbitrator finds a "clear violation" of the agreement, that "ex-
hausts his jurisdiction", and "enforcement of a statute must be left 
with those charged with the administration of that statute". The 
school board was found to be in violation of the agreement, direct-
ed to comply with it, and ordered to pay the sick pay cash credit 
for which its language provided. In a very important decision, but 
with a thoroughly inadequate opinion, the majority of the Divi-
sional Court quashed this award. 
I do not quarrel with the court's conclusion that an arbitration 
award can be quashed if it is based on a provision of a collective 
agreement made illegal by the statute. What is unsatisfactory is 
the number of vital issues which were left dangling, unanswered, 
on the way to that conclusion. The most obvious such issue was 
whether the provision in the contract really was illegal. The statute 
permitted a school board to set up a system of sick pay gratuities 
with cash payments on terminationof employment. Did this pro-
hibit the school board negotiating a sick leave credit plan with a 
union which, as part of the total renumeration of the employees, 
obligated the board to pay a different and larger cash credit on 
retirement? I should think this raised a nice question of statutory 
interpretation, at the very least, and Mr. Justice Osler in dissent, 
after a careful analysis of the statute and the problem, concluded 
that the provision in the agreement was not illegal. Without deign-
ing to address itself to the issue, the majority opinion asserted, 
without more, that the Act "expressly prohibited what the parties 
agreed to in article 16(1) (e) of the collective agreement". 
But let us assume that the agreement really was illegal and 
proceed to the issue which is germane to this article. What will 
the court have the arbitrator do in such a situation? Strangely 
enough, the opinion does not really tell us, or at least not in terms 
which are clear to me. We do know for sure that the court will 
quash an arbitration award which is based on what the judges 
think is an illegal contract, because that is exactly what they did. 
But we are never really told that arbitrators themselves should 
also look at the statutes and refuse to make awards based on pro-
visions in the agreement which they think are illegal. 
Mr. Justice Parker does quote from an opinion of Lord Den-
ning, reviewing a commercial arbitrator:' 
There is not one law for arbitrators and another for the court. There 
is one law for all. If a contract is illegal, then arbitrators must decline 
to award upon it, just as the court would do. 
That seems clear enough. Unfortunately its adoption would leave 
the general proposition (if not the narrow holdings) in Krever and 
Supra, footnote 44, at p. 14,757. 
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R.C.A. Victor in a rather shaky state. Yet the Divisional Court 
found no conflict at all, on the grounds that here there was "an 
issue of illegality", rather than an arbitral attempt to base its 
decision "on an interpretation of the statute rather than the col-
lective agreement". This distinction simply will not wash, at least 
as far as Krever is concerned, because, there, the arb"trator did 
refuse to enforce a provision of the agreement where he thought 
it would require illegal conduct from the employer, and Mr. Justice 
Stark reversed for that reason." More important, this supposed 
distinction was in fact considered by the arbitration board in the 
Etobicoke case. It said that the application of the statute to its 
situation required the interpretation of some difficult statutory 
terms, and this task it had no jurisdiction to undertake (because 
of Krever and R.C.A. Victor). Hence it would confine itself to 
the agreement and leave enforcement of the statute to those charg-
ed with that function (including especially the courts). In its re-
fusal to disavow the opinions in Krever and R.C.A. Victor, did 
the Division Court mean to agree with that view, and simply 
hold that judges can set aside arbitration awards for illegality?' 
But then what of the language of Lord Denning? 
I do not mean to deny the existence of a viable intermediate 
position. If the statute appears clearly to make a term in a collec-
tive agreement illegal, the arbitrator should decline to enforce 
the latter. On the other hand, if there are ambiguous and isputed 
47 1 should add that the ultimate holding in that case could be justified 
on the alternative ground that no such illegal conduct really was required
by the agreement. But the language in the Krever opinion goes much farther 
than that and this court did not explicitly draw any such distinction. 
48 That appears to be what happened in another Ontario decision, Bendix-
Automotive of Canada (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 14,089 (Ont. H.C.), a case 
which was not cited by this court. Here again, the problem was the inter-
action of O.H.S.I.P. and the collective agreement. The agreement required
the employer to provide full medical insurance under the Windsor Medical 
Services Plan, which covered 100% of the doctor's fees. When the Health 
Services Insurance Act, R.S.O., 1970, c. 200, was enacted, it provided for 
payment of only 90% of these same doctor's fees, in the pious hope that 
the doctors would accept this as full payment since the government was 
insuring them against unpaid bills. When this happy result did not material-
ize, the employees grieved and the arbitrator held the employer obligated 
to pay for the difference (under a complicated formula from which the 
judge differed, but in a direction more generous to the employees). The 
company was in the process of setting up machinery to do so when it was 
notified by the Ontario government that this would put it in breach of 
section 25(1) of the Health Services Insurance Act which forbade any 
more private medical insurance. When the company sought to quash the 
award on certiorari for an error of law, the Ontario High Court judge 
found that the arbitrator's interpretation of the agreement (with which he 
basically agreed) was in contravention of section 25 of the Act and null 
and void. As a result he quashed the award on the basis of the Act. No 
mention is made of R.C.A. Victor and Krever which quashed the arbitrator's 
awards for the legal error of looking at the statute. 
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provisions in the statute, the arbitrator should decline to resolve 
them and should give the benefit of the doubt to the collective 
agreement under which he was appointed. The losing party can 
take the case to court if it wishes a determination of the statutory 
problem and can get the award quashed if, on the court's interpre-
tation of the statute, the contractual provision turns out to be il-
legal. This seems to me to be a sensible approach and one I have 
advocated in an earlier article."9 But if it is what the court majority 
had in mind in Etobicoke, one would wish they had said so, and 
since this proposal was clearly adumbrated in Mr. Justice Osler's 
dissent, there can be no excuse for the omission." 
Equally troublesome is the treatment of R.C.A. Victor. Clearly 
there is a real distinction in that case. There the arbitrator not only 
refused to enforce the illegal obligation to provide private medical 
insurance but also undertook to order the company to pay the 
premiums for the new, substituted, statutory plan (O.H.S.I.P.). 
In Etobicoke, the employer simply asked the arbitrator not to en-
force the "illegal" cash payments under the sick pay plan. But 
the question remains, why should this distinction make a legal dif-
ference? Exactly that argument was made to the arbitration board 
and its response carries some force. The collective agreement tells 
him not to alter the agreement and R.C.A. Victor tells him not 
to enforce the statute. But if he excises a provision from the con-
tract, surely he alters the agreement. If he does so because of the 
statute, surely he enforces the statute. Agreed, he does not do so 
to quite the same extent as if he also goes on to direct compliance 
with a statutory term which has been substituted. The point is that 
once his purely contractual jurisdiction has been breached to some 
extent, what are the good legal and functional reasons for drawing 
the line at negative enforcement of the statute? 
Nor is this just an academic debating point. It goes to the heart 
of the practical problem in both R.C.A. Victor and Etobicoke. 
The parties have agreed to one kind of fringe benefit, whether 
medical insurance or sick pay. The statute has ordained that the 
scheme is illegal, void, and thus unenforceable in arbitration. But 
the same statute has permitted, or even required a different 
scheme as a replacement. The trouble is that the statute has omit-
49 op. cit., footnote 38. 
11 But I am puzzled as well by the restrictive attitude of Mr. Justice 
Oster to the scope of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, both here and in the 
Sarnia General Hospital case, supra, footnote 36. As one judge who had 
had extensive, experience with labour arbitration from the inside, I would 
have expected a somewhat more pragmatic and sensitive treatment of the 
problem. In particular, I would like to see him consider the implications 
of his stance in the Toronto Star Ltd. case, supra, footnote 14, and defend 
his choice of the spot at which he draws the line around the arbitrator's 
jurisdiction. 
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ted to provide its own vehicle for enforcing its positive directions. 
Denied the usual forum of arbitration, left with no readily avail-
able alternative in court, are employees to be left with no enforce-
able rights to part of their remuneration? Are employers to be 
left with the windfall saving in their employment costs? I readily 
admit that these questions are easier to ask than they are to an-
swer, but the beginning of wisdom in judging, as in any enquiry, 
is asking the right questions. As is shown by Etobicoke and al-
most all its forbears, we have not yet reached that beginning in the 
judicial appraisal of the remedial authority of arbitrators. 
(d) Laches. 
A final example of the assertion of a remedial power by an 
arbitrator, which has also reached the Ontario courts but received 
a less decisive response, involves the denial of a grievance on the 
ground of unreasonable delay in pursuing the claim. In Ottawa 
Newspaper Guild & Bower v. The Ottawa Citizen,5' Bower had 
been discharged and lodged a grievance. After the grievance pro-
cedure had been exhausted, the union waited 143 days before noti-
fying the company of its intention of going to arbitration. The arbi-
trator upheld the company's preliminary objection on the basis of 
the equitable doctrine of laches. The union took the decision to 
court and Mr. Justice Gale quashed this award. There were several 
reasons for his conclusion, but for our purposes this is the key 
passage in the opinion" 
Instead of examining the collective bargaining agreement to see whether 
the parties intended to bar employees, or others affected, from remedy 
if responsible for unreasonable delay, and, if so, then of considering 
whether there had been unreasonable delay in the circumstances of this 
case as disclosed by the evidence, the Board seems to have confined itself 
to applying the equitable doctrine of laches as such. Surely this was the 
wrong approach. 
In a subsequent British Columbia decision, The Saanich Fire-
fighters Union,3 the Ottawa Citizen case was distinguished-be-
yond recognition, I believe. The arbitrator had used the doctrine 
of laches, to bar a grievance which the union had dropped on 
June 27th, 1970, and then only under pressure from the grievor, 
reinstituted on April 28th, 1971. This decision was upheld on the 
ground that the arbitrator had not made the error of saying he 
had lost jurisdiction. Instead, he had merely exercised his power 
to deny a grievance for unreasonable delay in asserting it. Would 
such a ruling be upheld in Ontario now? Given Chief Justice 
Gale's injunction to look at the intention of the parties expressed 
" (1966), 66 C.L.L.C. 14,108 (Ont. H.C.).
52 Ibid., at p. 338. 
53 (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 14,110 (B.C.H.C.). 
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in their agreement rather than a general policy of the law, given 
the silence of the agreement regarding any time limits in institut-
ing arbitration, and given the progeny of Port Arthur Shipbuilding, 
one wonders. Yet the most recent decision of the Divisional Court 
in this area suggests that arbitrators may have such power. In 
" Dominion Glass Company Ltd., the union grieved about a chang-
ed job function some two months after the latter occurred. The 
agreement established a time limit of five days for individual griev-
ances but imposed no such explicit limit on union policy grievances 
such as this one. The arbitrator read other language in the griev-
ance provision as imposing the one set of time limits on the 
other form of grievance. This decision was quashed by the Divi-
sional Court as an unjustified construction and we need not dwell 
on those reasons here. In a tantalizing aside, Mr. Justice Lacour-
ci~re left the door open for some exercise of arbitral remedial 
powers to deal with delay:" 
In my opinion, where the article dealing with a policy grievance is 
silent as to the time limit within which such grievance may be brought, 
the only appropriate limitation is that it be brought within a reasonable 
time, as was done here. This seems to be in accordance with the 
practice of experienced labour arbitrators. See Award. . . . as an 
illustration of this commendable practice. 
Although only a dictum, and without any reference to the course 
of related judicial authorities, this is an encouraging sign. 
Let us turn now to a somewhat different situation of delay 
in the face of explicit time limits, a situation which has also gen-
erated important judicial forays into the arbitration process. A 
collective agreement provides that a party has ten days to give the 
other notice in writing of its intention to proceed to arbitration 
following the exhaustion of the grievance procedure. In a seniority 
case, the employee's claim is not settled and the union must de-
cide whether to go to the trouble and expense of arbitration. Con-
sultations among members of the grievance committee are delayed 
somewhat by a temporary transfer of the union president, but 
eventually the decision is affirmative and the company personnel 
manager is so informed. However, the written otice to the com-
pany with the name of the union's nominee is not mailed until 
- (1973), 73 C.L.L.C. 14,162 (Ont. Div. Ct). Some time after I finish-
ed this article, the decision of the Divisional Court was reversed in turn 
by the Ontario Court of Appeal on the ground that the arbitrator's inter-
pretation of the agreement was a reasonably possible one though perhaps 
not correct, on balance. Accordingly the language of the Divisional Court 
majority has very little authoritative force and indeed it was largely obiter 
dictum in any event. I discuss the case because it is a vehicle for raising. 
two important and recurring issues and because it is gratifying to see some 
faint hint of a more deferential judicial attitude towards the experience and 
reasoning of labour arbitrators. 
" Ibid., at p. 14,740. 
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the tenth and received until the eleventh day after the final griev-
ance meeting. If compliance with the time limits is made a "con-
dition" of arbitration, or if non-compliance explicitly renders the 
grievance "null and void" or "deemed to be withdrawn", does 
the arbitrator have the power to hear the merits of this case? 
Because the contract has provided its own explicit remedy for 
the breach of the time limits, there can be no question of any 
implied remedial power to relieve against this bargain freely made. 
That power could only be conferred by statute. In the case of 
Union Carbide of Canada,6 the Supreme Court of Canada re-
jected the only two legislative candidates in the Ontario Labour 
Relations Act. Given that conclusion the arbitrator's duty is 
clear. Any implied "common law" authority he might have is de-
signed to supplement he operation of the collective agreement, 
not to contradict it. As is true of just about every legal proposi-
tion, there is an apparent exception to this one also. Arbitrators 
commonly relieve against the operation of such time limits when 
the beneficiary allows the grievance to proceed for a time without 
asserting them, and this use of "waiver" has been judicially up-
held in the Ontario High Court. 7 
In my experience, while time limits are the rule in collective 
agreements, this explicit provision of the consequences of a breach 
of time limit is the exception. Accordingly, suppose the parties 
have laid down the standards to be followed, but have remained 
silent about the effect of delay on the validity of a grievance: if 
the union does delay at some stage in the grievance procedure, 
what is the arbitrator to do about it? 
Taking a strict view of the arbitrator's jurisdiction, the logical 
answer is that he should do nothing. He is called on to read the 
agreement and decide whether there was a valid grievance. If in 
view of the facts and the proper interpretation of the contract 
terms, the claim obtains on the merits, the arbitrator must so hold. 
The union may have delayed in processing the grievance and the 
arbitrator might even "declare" that this has occurred. But how 
can he use this subsequent breach by the union as a ground for 
denying a valid individual grievance if the agreement does not 
tell him to do so. The logical corollary of Port Arthur Shipbuilding 
and Union Carbideis that he has no "inherent jurisdiction" to do 
SO. 
The consensus in recent arbitration decisions is that arbitra-
tors must not automatically deny grievances on the merits be-
cause of procedural defects. This result is expressed in terms of a 
56 [19681 S.C.R. 966; see supra, footnote 33. 
5 Cf. R. v. Lane; ex parte Green (1966), 66 C.L.L.C. 14,137 (Ont. 
H.C.); also Automatic Screw Machine Products (1971), 71 C.L.L.C. 14,080 
(Ont. H.C.). 
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distinction between "mandatory" and "directory" time limits. 
These are not the happiest terms of legal art insofar as they sug-
gest that the time limits are not intended to be binding. The point 
of the distinction is in the proper remedy for a breach. If the agree-
ment lays down its own remedy-for instance, that the grievance 
is deemed to be withdrawn, as in Hoar Transport Company 
Ltd.,58-- arbitrators must comply with it. But if the parties merely 
stated that certain time limits "shall be followed", and left blank 
the consequences if they are not, the arbitrator must use some 
judgment in fashioning the appropriate remedy. Happily this ar-
bitral consensus also found favour with the Divisional Court in 
Dominion Glass Company:59 
In any event, even if the time limit of 5 days at Step No. I had been 
found to be applicable, it was, in my opinion, a directory requirement 
only, stating a procedure but not providing a penalty. . . . In such 
circumstances, a Board should not refuse to consider the merits of a 
grievance, particularly where the slight delay cannot in any way pre-
judice the company in the preparation or presentation of its defence. 
Thus the Board would not be deprived of jurisdiction. 
This willingness of Mr. Justice Lacourci~re to look to the common 
sense of an arbitrator's jurisdiction, and to learn from the arbitra-
tion reports something of the alternatives, is as admirable in a 
judge as it is unusual. One can only hope that it will be emulated 
in the future." 
58[1969] S.C.R. 634; see supra, footnote 33. 
5 9 upra, footnote 54, at p. 14,741. I should add that while I agree with 
Mr. Justice Lacourci~re's statement of the general legal principle, I am 
dubious about his application of it to the facts of this case. One part of 
the grievance clause stated that a time limit "shall be complied with". The 
arbitrator said this seemed to be "mandatory" in the grammatical sense 
but that misses the point. It should not be taken as "mandatory" in the 
technical legal sense of making the grievance a nullity simply because there 
is a breach of the directive. However, the collective agreement also provided
that: "No matter may be submitted to arbitration which has not been prop-
erly carried through the grievance procedure." This does clearly satisfy the 
definition of a "mandatory" time limit, as a term of legal art. The parties
have provided themselves for the remedial consequences of a defect in 
procedure and in the absence of statutory authority arbitrators must respect
their bargain. I understand that the union conceded this point in the argu-
ment in front of the Ontario Court of Appeal and the latter's decision fo-
cused on the real nub of that case, the issue of construction of the specific 
language of that agreement. 
60For that reason it is worth-while elaborating somewhat on the con-
text and the reasons for this arbitration doctrine. First of all, the conse-
quence of characterizing a time limit as "directory" is that non-compliance
will bar grievances if, and only if, the delav was unreasonable (and, as we 
saw. Lacourci~re J. accented that as well). This is the sense of the doctrine 
of laches, but with the difference that the parties have crvstallized their 
own views of what time limits are anpropriate. But the arbitrator must still 
look at the underlving circumstances to anpraise the reasons for the breach 
and to assess the nreiudicial effect, if any, on the other side. In fact. I once 
suggested that the arbitrator might even assess the conseauences of delav 
in monetary terms and compensate the other party on this basis. The point 
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IV. Our Future Legal Options. 
How shall we appraise this trend in recent Canadian judicial de-
cisions? No consistent theme really appears. Sometimes an expan-
sive conception of the arbitrator's authority is accepted. The domi-
nant trend, though, at least since Port Arthur Shipbuilding, is the 
denial of the power to use such remedies as rectification, estoppel 
or laches in adjudicating grievances. The argument is that arbitra-
tors have no inherent jurisdiction, unlike the superior courts, to 
apply legal doctrines which are not part of the written agreement 
of the parties. They must simply read that agreement and follow 
it wherever it leads, whatever be the incongruity, perhaps even 
the illegality, of the result. 
One hesitates to dignify the propositions advanced in these 
several judicial opinions by the label "reasons". On the surface 
the courts seem driven by the tyranny of the concept "inherent 
jurisdiction" but there was nothing inevitable about any one of 
these conclusions. In each of these cases, the law had to be settled 
about the precise scope of arbitration jurisdiction. At first instance, 
the arbitrators had concluded they had the authority to use a legal 
doctrine, and in so doing followed a long-established tradition 
in the arbitration reports. Eventually the issue was presented to 
the courts by a disgruntled party to the arbitration, and we would 
receive a decisive answer about what the law was to be. But the 
approach of the respective judges is completely question-begging. 
It resembles nothing so much as the magician who has carefully 
stowed a rabbit away in his hat, and then looks surprised for the 
audience when he reaches in his hand and pulls it out. 
I do not mean to suggest that any one of these decision-makers, 
be he arbitrator or judge, is left with a total discretion to do what-
ever he wants. We can find ample legal materials, emanating from 
is that this is a much more reasonable remedy than the draconian result of 
barring a valid grievance altogether, and thus possibly denying an employee
who had been unjustly discharged by the company any redress at all be-
cause of the laxity of the union. 
Not only is this general approach to the remedial problem a more 
reasonable one, but it is also the only way to preserve some reciprocity in 
the impact of time limits. Suppose it were the legal rule that a union breach 
of a time limit automatically invalidated a grievance? Is there also to be a 
rule that a company breach would bar the employee's grievance? Obviously 
not, because this would offend against the principle that a person should 
not profit from his own wrongs. But then should the company automatic-
ally lose a grievance if it is in breach of a time limit (e.g., in responding at 
some stage in the grievance procedure)? That would preserve some degree
of fairness in the operation of the procedures, by encouraging management 
to comply with them, but surely at the cost of disposing of grievances on a
wholly irrelevant basis. But then is it not just as senseless to say that an 
employee should automatically lose his claim because some union steward 
was a few days late at some stage in the grievance process? An arbitrator 
should not take the latter step unless he is prepared to take the former, and 
there is very little one can say in favour of either. 
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several authoritative sources, which set the parameters for the 
ultimate conclusion. The collective agreement has set out a defini-
tion of the scope of the arbitrator's authority, and the integrity of 
this provision must be respected. But arbitration has been man-
dated by statute for the purpose of securing final and peaceful 
settlement of grievances, and this legislative policy is at least as 
authoritative as the mutual intentions of the contracting parties. 
Some accommodation between the two must be worked out. The 
watershed in this endeavour was crossed in Polymer when the 
statute was appealed to in order to justify the key remedial power 
of awarding damages. As I said earlier, this decision stands ineluct-
ably for the proposition that labour arbitrators can have implied 
powers which the parties have not explicitly conferred. That case 
has not been judicially repudiated; in fact it has been extended in 
important respects. As long as it stands, it is not legally defensible 
for a court to deny automatically to labour arbitration the further 
remedial powers which may be asserted. 
It is true that the Supreme Court of Canada, without even 
mentioning its own precedent in Polymer, tried to place some 
limits on the arbitral fashioning of new remedies in the Port Arthur 
Shipbuilding case. Whatever one may say of the court's concen-
tration on the limited contractual jurisdiction of the arbitrator, 
the fact is clear that its view was repudiated by the Ontario legis-
lature shortly afterwards." I read section 37 (8) " as a further stamp 
of legislative approval of a wider role for arbitrators in adminis-
tering collective agreements and the desirability of supplementary 
remedial powers for that purpose. 
This is the crucial legal background within which these later 
assertions of arbitral authority should have been (and still should 
61Although the Supreme Court focused on the other facet of the arbitra-
tion process when it was required to justify the legality of its own interven-
tion. Certiorari is a remedy available only against "statutory" tribunals, not 
private, contractual arbitration. In the Supreme Court of Canada in Port 
Arthur Shipbuilding, the company's appeal was challenged on this very
ground. After quoting the then section 34(1) of the Ontario Labour Rela-
tions Act, supra, footnote 5, Mr. Justice Judson said: "The wording is clear 
and unambiguous. The parties to a collective agreement must arbitrate their 
dispute. There is no alternative course of action open to them. The legisla-
tion compels recourse to an arbitration board and that board is therefore 
a statutory creation and hence subject to review in the courts by certiorari." 
Supra, footnote 19, at p. 94. It is bad enough that Mr. Justice Judson did 
not even refer to the argument he made to the contrary some ten years 
before, in settling the law on this crucial issue (see (1956) 1 D.L.R. (2d) 
775 (Ont. H.C.)). It is even worse that he now chooses to rely on the 
statutory character of grievance arbitration to get the judicial foot in the 
door and then concentrates solely on the contractualcharacter of that pro-
cess to find a legal error in the arbitrator's award. Again I do not argue
that such a distinction, however improbable, is logically impossible. We 
were not offered, for examination, any reasons by which the two positions 
could be reconciled. 
"Supra, footnote 5. 
55 1974] Remedial Authority of Labour Arbitrator 
be) appraised. In no case will the later answers be automatic from 
that vantage point. The earlier precedents furnish analogies and 
suggest a basic principle for the area. They still require practical 
judgments about the appropriateness of the remedial powers in 
each new type-situation. One can see that approach in many, 
though not all, analyses of the problem by arbitrators; but it is 
conspicuous by its absence in most of the recent interventions by 
the judges. 
The question in each of these cases was the same: do arbitra-
tors have the authority to apply supplementary legal doctrines in 
adjudicating grievances brought under the express terms of a 
collective agreement? Logically, there are three alternative an-
swers: either the doctrine is totally inapplicable to collective agree-
ments, or the arbitrator is perfectly entitled to use it, or the doc-
trine can be applied to the situation in court but the arbitrator 
must stick to reading the agreement. I shall not dwell on the 
first option and try to appraise the worth of such concepts as 
laches, estoppel, rectification and so on in labour relations. Ad-
mittedly not every traditional judicial remedy is compatible with 
the peculiar environment of collective agreements. For example, 
if one party is deemed to repudiate a contract through a funda-
mental breach of his own obligations, the other may elect to re-
scind the agreement for the future. In the case of the statutory 
requirement of minimum terms for collective agreements, and 
the general legislative policy favouring a stable period under the 
agreement, that doctrine should not be applied, whether in arbi-
tration or the courts." I do not believe this conclusion is war-
ranted for the legal remedies under examination here, at least when 
they are tailored to fit the realities of collective bargaining. Be 
that as it may, this alternative was not the gist of any of the de-
cisions I have considered, which were concerned simply with the 
question of whether the arbitrator had the jurisdiction to use 
them. Assuming that they are applicable to collective agreements 
(as certainly is the case with the notion of "illegality") we are 
faced with options two and three. Put thus baldly, I find it hard 
to think of a decent argument in favour of number three, the one 
our courts appear to favour." 
" And was so stated by Mr. Justice McRuer in Polymer, supra, footnote 
11, at p. 615; see also Gould Manufacturing of Canada, supra, footnote 27, 
for further implications of that proposition.
" Perhaps I should elaborate somewhat on that last statement. The 
favour found by the courts in the third option is more negative than posi-
tive. The trend in the cases is to deny arbitrators the power to administer 
these legal remedies. But no one of the cases suggests that the legal doc-
trines are inapplicable to collective agreements on their merits. If they are 
to be implied, then logically the only forum in which this can be done is 
the court. That was the explicit suggestion of the Ontario Court of Appeal 
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I realize that the pattern of decisions is somewhat uneven, and 
the language in some opinions is not completely negative. But 
suppose we consider one possible consistent theme, a series of 
holdings each one of which has been subscribed to by one Ontario 
judge or another. Arbitrators must ignore mistakes in transcribing 
the results of negotiations, disregard detrimental reliance on the 
representations of one side, and then turn a blind eye on prejudicial 
delay in processing grievances. Once he upholds a claim in the 
face of these factors, he may even have to steel himself to order a 
result which may be illegal for its target to carry out. I submit 
that if arbitrators are to do a fair and efficient job of adjudicating 
disputes under collective agreements, they simply cannot have their 
powers gradually whittled away like that. Not one of these restric-
tions is as serious as would have been the denial of the power to 
award damages in Polymer; still, the cumulative impact of the 
sequence of decisions since Port Arthur Shipbuilding is serious 
and troubling. 
Are these patent injustices avoided by the suggestion that the 
injured party can seek-relief from the arbitrator's award in courts? 
On the face of it, this would seem an inefficient duplication of 
proceedings. It detracts from the speedy, inexpensive, and inform-
al remedy originally foreseen by the legislature for labour griev-
ances. Whenever one of these collateral issues arises, it must go 
to the courts for a decision. Doctrinally this alternative is very 
dubious in the face of another Ontario statute, the Rights of La-
bour Act.' Pragmatically it will be difficult to achieve, especially 
when the remedy turns on complex and controverted facts which 
must be established for the first time through the procedure of 
judicial review. Such a truncated conception of labour arbitration 
can only render the process much less serviceable to the parties 
and the public. 
The problems with the third option are clear. Is there any-
thing wrong with the second alternative, one which allows arbi-
trators to apply these supplementary legal remedies at the first in-
stance, to secure a "final and binding settlement of the dispute"? 
Almost all labour arbitrators, are legally trained and, in any event, 
the task of using concepts such as estoppel is no more demand-
ing than the interpretation of contract language (pursuant to 
legal principles such as the parole evidence rule)? Perhaps our 
judges are worried about' the possibility that arbitrators may go 
badly awry in an unfamiliar area. This may be a self-serving state-
in Metropolitan Police Association regarding "rectification". It may be 
implicit in the failure of the Divisional Court to grasp the nerve of the 
legal problem in Etobicoke. I can think of no reason why the same logic, 
or illogic, is not equally valid with respect to estoppel, laches, and so on. 
SR.S.O., 1970, c. 416. 
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ment, but, on the record of over twenty years of arbitral juris-
prudence, I do not believe that fear is well founded. In any event, 
the concern is irrelevant. The party who disagrees with the deci-
sion can always go to court and obtain judicial review of any 
alleged errors of law in the award, and the scope of such review 
is certainly expansive." It might just be that, in a substantial 
proportion of cases, the arbitrator's decision will be clearly correct 
and accepted as such by the parties without any need for an 
extra layer of decision. I think if one examined each of the dif-
ferent remedies I have talked about realistically, one could find 
nothing in their application which is inconsistent with either free 
collective bargaining or a proper adjudicative role for arbitration." 
It may be that the institution of private, ad hoc arbitration 
is no longer needed. Certainly the courts have overcome their 
earlier reluctance and shown a desire to plunge into the world of 
collective agreement. 8 For the moment, though, the legislature's 
earlier selection of arbitration remains law and fidelity to this 
judgment requires a legal framework conducive to successful 
grievance arbitration. And this is what is threatened by the thread 
we see running through the recent decisions. Our judges seem 
uncomfortable with the use of any materials for decision beyond 
the bare surface language of the collective agreement. 9 Perhaps 
66 It is not pertinent to the main theme of this article, but one cannot 
but be struck by the extensive supervision of arbitrators now undertaken 
in courts and the willingness of judges to substitute their own wishes as to 
the merits. Nor is there any consistency at all in the approach taken to the 
task of interpreting the collective agreement. Two recent decisions are in-
structive in this regard: Niagara Wire and Weaving (1969), 69 C.L.L.C. 
14,228 (Ont. H.C.), where the judge imposed a rigid and remorseless logic 
on the arbitrator and Northern Electric (1973), 73 C.L.L.C. 14,154 (Ont.
Div. Ct), where the judge used a free-wheeling style to relieve the company
of its obligations in a situation where he obviously believed it to be equit-
able. If there is a consistent thread to be found in the pattern of such 
judicial reversals of arbitration awards, I would like someone to enlighten 
me as to what it is. 
" I would qualify that judgment somewhat with respect to the more 
nettlesome issue of "illegality". I have canvassed the different factors in-
volved in the issue in much more detail in the article cited supra, footnote 
38. 
68 See Hamilton Street Railway Co. v. Northcott, [1967] S.C.R. 3; Adell, 
Comment, (1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 354. 
69 The prime example of this attitude is the decision of the Ontario 
Court of ApDeal in R. v. Barber et al. ex parte Warehousemen's Union and 
Steinberg's Ltd., [1968] 2 O.R. 245. Here the court held that resort to ex-
trinsic evidence of past practice in the administration of a term in a collec-
tive agreement amounted to an error of law in the interpretation of the 
meaning of that term: "Where a writing is unambiguous such evidence, al-
though received, cannot be used to construe it. It is true that at least in 
some respects a collective agreement is different from an ordinary com-
mercial contract. But the orincinle that requires the intention of parties to 
be derived from their lain written words rather than from extrinsic evi-
dence is one applicable to all writings clearly defining rights between 
parties. In acting on the oral evidence which is admitted, I think the 
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that is why they want arbitrators to ignore evidence of the negotia-
tions of the parties-even as reflected in a signed memorandum 
of agreement-later conduct or representations which may have 
induced action by the other party, or prejudicial delay in the 
assertion of these claims. Judges may prefer this blinkered, arti-
ficial and legalistic approach to labour relations for themselves, 
but it is precisely that attitude which led the legislatures to entrust 
the administration of collective agreements to arbitration, rather 
than the ordinary courts. Now the courts are intervening to fasten 
their own approach on arbitrators, to override decades of indus-
trial jurisprudence with uninformed and casual asides, and to 
remove the various instruments necessary for fair and efficient 
adjudication in any legal environment. 
Save for Metropolitan Police Association, not one of these 
deplorable conclusions is a firm and binding decision of an ap-
pellate court. The law is in a state of flux and could yet be settled 
in accordance with a very different conception of the arbitrator's 
function and remedial authority. The point of this article is to 
suggest an alternative approach: the optimists among us can al-
ways be hopeful of a more sensible and restrained attitude on the 
part of our judges-and I have pointed out examples where it 
has occurred. Frankly, I am not sanguine. But then, like our 
Prime Minister, I can be philosophical. "And whether or not it 
is clear to you, no doubt the universe is unfolding as it should"."' 
majority of the board acted illegally .... " At pp. 252-253. It would not 
be profitable here to speculate on possible rationales for the judicial im-
position of this legal doctrine on the arbitrator's interpretationof the col-
lective agreement co-existing with judicial denial of an arbitrator's resort to 
equally established legal doctrines in the administrationand adjudicationof 
rights under that same agreement. Within the pragmatic framework I have 
sketched in this article for analyzing such problems, each doctrine must 
ultimately be appraised separately (though with some common thread of 
argument). More important for my purposes here is the evidence of the 
latent judicial attitude which surfaced near the end of the opinion, Mr. 
Justice Jessup quoted the arbitrator's view that, because collective agree-
ments are contracts of parties who live together in a continuing relation-
ship, a board of arbitration should take care to investigate and assess the 
underlying factors which surround a dispute about the meaning of the 
agreement: "To tell a party that that contract is clear without so investigat-
ing seems likely to undermine the party's confidence in the arbitration 
process." Jessup J.A. summarily rejected this view: "With respect I think 
that it is of at least equal importance that confidence be maintained in the 
integrity of collective agreements the words of which are plain. There are 
few agreements the language of which is read and relied on by so many
and the choice of which, including the omission and inclusion of particular
words, is the result of more and more protracted negotiations." Ibid., at p. 
254. In the final analysis, the conflict between these two approaches can 
only be sorted out in terms of what it means to say that the meaning of 
words is "plain", "clear", or "unambiguous", and this entails critical as-
sumptions about the nature of interpretation of legal language. BtW then 
that is the subject of another article. 
70 Desiderata in Poems of Max Ehrmann (1948). 
